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Abstract
This article tackles the feature of optimal public policy such as the level of enforce-
ment and the supply of public goods in an economy characterized by a huge informal
sector. We consider informality as the group of productive activities that do not com-
ply (totally or partially) with government regulations. The Government intervenes as
a Stackelberg leader and has to decide how to allocate public expenditures, collected
through the tax system, between the provision of a public good, which can only be
used for formal activties, and enforcement e¤ort, aimed at detecting informal rms
that evade taxes. Taking the public policy as given, a representative family, owner
of a representative rm, decides how to split a x amount of labour supply between
formal and informal activities. Our results show that the greater are the distortions
in the tax collection process, the larger is the size of the informal sector. Finally, we
derive the properties of the optimal public policy. In particular, we show that the
shadow cost of public fund represent the rationale of enforcement spending.
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1. Introduction
The size of the informal sector in many developing economies, as measured by Schneider
(2005), is close to 40%, especially in many Latin American countries.1 What is more
worrying is that in the medium term, informality levels are on the rise in many developing
economies. According to Perry et al. (2007) informality levels in most Latin American
countries increased between the late 1980s and the begining of 2000s. Most measures
of informality analysed in Perry et al. (2007)2 show a signicant increase in informality
levels in most Latin American countries. As pointed out in La Porta and Shleifer (2014),
the informal sector has extremely low productivity compared to the formal economy since
informal rms tend to be smaller and ine¢ cient.
The model we propose in this article builds on Mejía and Posada (2011). In partic-
ular, we consider informality as the group of productive activities which, ex-ante, do not
comply with government regulations. This non-compliance with government regulations
can take place in di¤erent dimensions of economic activity such as tax evasion, social secu-
rity payments, minimum wages, sanitary and environmental regulations, etc. Furthermore,
non-compliance with norms or regulations may be partial or total.3 One of the most salient
costs of being informal is the lack of access to some governement-provided services such
as access to the judicial system to resolve contract-related disputes or the imposibility of
participating in public trainning programs. Therefore, at the individual level, the decision
to become informal can be viewed as a rational response to the system of incentives im-
plemented by government enforcement on the one hand, and the provision of some public
goods (that can only be accessed if the rm or the individual fully comply with govern-
ment regulations) on the other hand. In particular, rms might decide to become informal
if the tax rate becomes too high for formal activities to be protable (compared with infor-
mal activities where taxes can be partially or totally evaded). Nevertheless, even though
such decisions might be rational at an individual level, this collective action problem may
generate aggregate ine¢ ciencies (Loayza, 2007).
1According to La Porta and Shleifer (2014), in the poorest countries it is about 50%.
2Percentage of employed workers, percentage of salaried workers, percentage of the labor force that
lacks pensions and percentage of self employed, among others.
3We focus on the informal sector and do not consider the so-called underground economy. Namely,
while the latter can be characterised as a violation to the penal code, the former is not. In particular,
tax avoidance in many countries or the violation of environmental laws is not necessarily investigated and
punished by the penal system.
In this article, we develop a model in which a representative individual (or household)
decides the amount of time she allocates to operate in a formal rm (or technology) and in
an informal rm. On the one hand, by working with the formal technology, the individual
can take advantage of a public good in the production process but has to pay taxes. On
the other hand, the individual may decide to operate with the informal rm but cannot
take advantage of the public good in the production process.4 Additionally, the rm can be
detected evading taxes with a probability that is both increasing in the level of government
enforcement and the size of the informal rms activities. In case of being detected, the
informal rm has to pay the evaded taxes plus a ne of a given size.
We consider a non-paternalistic government which maximises the representative house-
holds welfare.5 We assume that the State plays as a Stackelberg leader and decides how
to allocate public expenditures, collected through the tax system, between the provision of
a public good (which can only be used by the rms operating in the formal sector6) and
enforcement activities, aimed at detecting the informal rm evading taxes. When deciding
the optimal provision of the public good as well as the enforcement level, the government
takes into account how the representative family reacts to these decisions. In such a context
and taking into account the shadow cost of public fund, we characterise the optimal stick
and carrot policy.
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, it contributes to the growing literature
on informality by providing a new view where the size of the informal sector is endogenously
determined by the interaction between the government and individual decisions. While
Cerda and Saravia (2013) focus on (heterogenous) rms decision to allocate time and
factors between both sectors, we rather consider that this decision comes from workers and
thus is taken by a representative consumer.7 Our theoretical set-up allows us to point out
the link between the size of the informal sector and the shadow cost of public funds that
4We assume that the public good is not a pure public good in the sense that the government can partially
or totally exclude informal rms from using it. Thus, we are formally refering to a club good.
5The debate concerning the States objective in the presence of an informal sector (where a norm is
partially or totally violated) is quite complex. It might seem natural to assume that the States objective
is to maximise formal production and disincentive informal production (see for instance Mejia and Posada
[2011] for a positive analysis using this assumption). However, it can also be realistic to think about a
less paternalistic State that simply maximises the representative households utility. For instance, this
assumption may reect a democratic political system in which the government has been elected in function
of the majoritys preferences in terms of enforcement.
6In this sense this is not a pure public good as it is possible to exclude users.
7Another di¤erence is that their model is intensive and extensive while we focus on an intensive approach.
is in line with the empirical evidence presented in Auriol and Walters (2006). Indeed, we
show that the greater are these distortions, the larger is the size of the informal sector.
This result is also consistent with Adaman and Mumcus (2010) ndings. In a global game
framework, they show that ine¢ ciencies and the low level of trustworthiness of the public
sector induces an equilibrium with high levels of informality (see also Torgler and Schneider
[2009] for empirical evidence). Despite the fact that the State cannot observe the level of
informal production, it is optimal to spend all the budget in public goods and nothing in
enforcement activities as long as there is no shadow cost of public funds. In other words, our
model reveals that the shadow cost of public funds constitutes the rationale for spending
in enforcement activities.
Additionaly to the previous works already quoted, our paper is related to and borrows
from a number of stands of the literature. Cremer and Gahvari (1994) determines the
optimal tax design in the presence of tax evasion. They provide su¢ cient conditions under
which tax evasion decreases the optimal tax rate, while showing that an increase in the
optimal tax rate is also possible. Boadway et al. (2009) resumes this issue but considering
explicitly the presence of an informal sector. As in our paper, the size of the informal sector
is endogenous and mainly determined by public policies. Nevertheless, Cremer and Gavhari
(1994) and Boadway et al. (2009) focus on optimal taxation issues, while our analysis is
devoted to the optimal public policy analysis subject to a balanced budget constraint (e.g.,
the choice between the carrots - the publicgood provision - and the sticks - enforcement
activities).
Besfamille et al. (2009) analyse the relation between tax enforcement, aggregate output
and government revenue when imperfectly competitive rms evade a specic output tax.
They reveal that aggregate output decreases with the level of tax enforcement. Government
revenue increases with enforcement when the tax rate is low but, when the tax rate is high,
government revenue is either inversely U-shaped or decreasing in the level enforcement.
In line with Besfamille et al. (2009), our article analyses the relationship between the tax
level, enforcement and government revenue. We point out that the size of the tax distortion
(e.g. the shadow cost of public funds) is inversely related to the size of the formal sector,
the tax rate and the optimal provision of the publicgood; and, is positively related to the
size of the informal sector and optimal enforcement activities.8
Finally, our enforcement e¤ort variable can be seen as a stochastic way to tax the
8There are obviously other channels to explain the size of informal sector. See for instance DErasmo
(2015) for a channel related to the access to credit.
informal sector (Muribu, 2010). Even though we do not have tax thresholds e¤ects such as
Kanbur and Keen (2014), the fact that the probability of detection increases in the size of
the informal sector also constitutes an incentive to limit its size.
The rest of our article is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up. Section
3 characterises the optimal public policy in various contexts. First, we solve the central
planner problem when he is able to choose the time devoted by the representative family
in both sectors. Next, we consider the decentralised model with tax distortions. The last
section presents some concluding remarks.
2. The model
The production of the nal good in the formal sector, yf , depends on the amount of
labor allocated by the representative household to this sector, lf ; and on a public good,
b, produced by the State. The production function in the formal sector is described by
yf = f(lf ; b): Naturally, we assume that the formal sector is characterized by positive and
decreasing returns to each input: flf ; fb > 0 and flf lf ; fbb  0. Additionally, we assume
that formal labor and the public good are complementary in the production of the nal
good: flf b > 0. Alternatively, the nal good can be produced in the informal sector, i.e.
yi = g(li), with gli > 0 and glili  0. We consider that there is no positive externality
from the formal to the informal sector.9 Actually, it is the relative advantage generated
by the public good between the two sectors and not the absolute that is relevant for the
representative household´s optimal allocation decisions. As the benet generated by the
public good in the formal sector is endogenous, the assumption of no externality to the
informal sector is not restrictive.
We note p(li; e) the probability that the State detects the informal rm evading taxes.
This probability depends on the size of the informal rm li and on the States allocation
of resources to enforcement activities e. We assume pe > 0; pee  0; pli > 0 and plili  0.
In words, the probability that an informal rm is detected evading taxes is increasing in
the States enforcement e¤orts, but with decreasing returns. The probability of detection
is increasing and convex in the size of the informal rm. We also assume that p(:) satises
the following Inada condition: @p(0; li)=@e = +1. Furthermore, we consider that peli  0,
9In the informality literature, the expression public good is often used. Nevertheless, in our framework,
as long as the the informal sector cannot benet from the public good, stricly speaking, we should refer to
b as a club good.
which means that the marginal e¤ect of enforcement on the probability of detection is
increasing in the size of the informal rm (the level of enforcement).
We assume that the cost to an informal rm of being detected evading taxes consists
of a ne of size g(li). This ne may be interpreted as the opportunity cost of not being
able to produced if the rm is closed down for a certain amount of time or as a pure
ne that the rm has to pay if it is detected.10 The representative household takes the
strategic variables of the State (tax rate, enforcement, and public good provision) as given.
We consider that the households total labor supply, Ls, is exogenously given. Thus, the
households decision consists only in allocating the total labor supply between the formal
and the informal sector in order to maximise his expected income. The problem faced by
the representative household can be written as:
max
flf ;lig
(1  )f(lf ; b) + g(li)  p(e; li)g(li); (1)
s.t Ls = lf + li; (2)
where (1   )f(lf ; b) represents the net income (after tax) earned in the formal sector,
while g(li) denotes the income earned in the informal sector. These income levels must be
reduced by p(e; li)g(li), the expected cost of the ne if li > 0.
The optimal allocation of labor between the formal and the informal sector is given
by:11
gli(li) (1  p(e; li))  pli(e; li)g(li) = (1  )flf (lf ; b): (3)
The households optimal allocation of labor between the formal and the informal sector is
such that the expected net marginal benet from allocating an extra unit of time to the
informal sector is equal to its net marginal benet in the formal sector. On the one hand,
the marginal benet from allocating an extra unit of time to the informal sector (the left
hand side of equation 3) is given by the marginal productivity in the informal sector gli(li)
times (1  p(e; li)), minus the marginal increase in the probability of being detected, pli ,
times the size of the ne that has to be paid if the rm is detected, g(li). On the other
10In this article, since we consider a risk-neutral representative household, we do not focus on the trade-
o¤ between enforcement e¤ort and the size of the ne. Finally, we consider that the ne takes a nite
value due to a limited liability argument. Otherwise, the solution would be straightforward and would
have followed an argument a la Becker: the ne would be equal to innity. This limited liability argument
is also a manner to explain why in practice the amount of resources collected by States through nes are
rather limited.
11We adopt an intensive approach and thus focus our attention on interior solution.
hand, the net marginal benet from allocating an extra unit of time to the formal sector
(right hand side of equation 3) is simply composed of the marginal productivity of labor in
the formal sector net of taxes, (1  )flf .
Remark 1. All other things equal, the level of production in the formal sector increases
with the level of provision of public goods and enforcement activities.
Proof : See appendix.
A higher provision of the public good makes the formal production more attractive,
ceteris paribus, due to the fact that labor and the public good are complementary in the
production process. As the amount of enforcement e¤orts increases, the incentive to allocate
time to the informal sector decreases because the probability of being caught evading taxes
and having to pay the ne increases. Therefore, both instruments allow the State to reduce
the size of the informal sector.
3. The optimal public policy
In this section we distinguish between several cases. We start with a rst-best analysis
where the State acts as a central planner and can directly choose the representative house-
holds labor supply between the formal and informal sectors, lf and li respectively. In
the second-best allocation, we consider the situation in which the State cannot choose or
impose the household labor supply between the two sectors. Nevertheless, it still behaves
as a Stackelberg leader in the sense that it chooses the vector (b; e; ) taking into account
the optimal reaction of the representative household to her choices.
3.1. First-best analysis
In a rst-best analysis, the State can directly choose the households allocation of time
between the formal and the informal sector. In such a context, enforcement activities, as
captured by e, should be interpreted as the cost generated by the burden of the proof. The
States objective is the maximisation of the households utility, that is:
max
flf ;b;eg
W FB = (1  )f(lf ; b) + g(Ls   lf )
 
1  p(e; Ls   lf )

; (4)
subject to the following budget constraint:
(1  )f(lf ; b) + p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf )  b+ e: (5)
The budget constraint says that the tax collected plus the ne earned through the
detection process is equal to the sum of the expenditures in the public good and detection
e¤orts. Following La¤ont and Tirole (1993), an easy way to capture these distortions is
to consider that for each unit of tax collected, a proportion  is lost.12 Because a fraction
 of the taxes collected is lost, the rst term in the left hand side of the States budget
constraint is scaled down by a fraction 1  .
As the tax and the detection e¤orts intervene negatively in the objective function, it is
straightforward that the budget constraint is binding. Therefore, we write the tax rate 
that ensures that the budget constraint holds with equality as:
 =
b+ e  p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf )
(1  ) f(lf ; b) : (6)
Replacing (6) in the States objective function, the States program becomes:
max
flf ;b;eg
W FB = f(lf ; b) + g(Ls   lf )  b+ e
1   +

1  p(e;
Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ): (7)
The objective function is then composed of the sum of the production in both sectors,
minus the States expenditures in enforcement and the public good (b + e), scaled down
by a fraction 1  . Additionally, the ne collected p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ) must be added
as it relaxes the budget constraint. It is worth to notice that the expected ne collected,
p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ), is multiplied by  because for each 1$ coming from the ne (e.g.,
not coming from tax distortions), $ is saved.13
In the rst-best scenario, in addition to maximise the welfare function with respect to
its policy instruments b and e, the State is able to chose the amount of labor supply in the
formal sector (lf). Moreover, since the tax rate is dened by the budget constraint, it is
equivalent to maximise with respect to  or one of these instruments, i.e. b and e.
Proposition 1. The rst-best allocation is characterized by:
i)
@f(Ls lf ;b)
@lf
  @g(Ls l

f )
@lf
= 
1 

@p(e;Ls lf )
@lf
g(Ls   lf ) +
@g(Ls lf )
@lf
p(e; Ls   lf )

;
ii)
@f(Ls lf ;b)
@b
= 1
1  ;
iii)
@p(e;Ls lf )
@e
g(Ls   lf ) = 1 :
12In some extent, 1   captures the tax system quality: when 1$ is collected through tax,  is lost.
13In this setting, we ignore that some distortions may be associated to the ne system. In appendix 2,
we show that our results remain valid as long as the tax distortion is higher than the distortion introduced
by the ne system.
Condition (i) is an e¢ ciency condition: if the State is able to choose the households
allocation of time between the formal and the informal sectors on the one hand, and there
is no tax distortions on the other, i.e.  = 0, she would choose an allocation such that
the marginal productivity of labor is the same in both sectors. Moreover, this condition
reveals that, for a given level of provision of the public good, the States optimal allocation
of labor to the formal sector decreases with the presence of tax distortions. Because taxes
create distortions and the nes collected constitute an alternative source of revenue, the
State is more lenient on informality compared with the case of no distortions. Condition
(ii) says that the State chooses the optimal provision of the public good in such a way that
the marginal productivity of the public good is equal to the marginal cost of providing it,
weighted by the size of the tax distortion. All other things equal, for higher values of ,
the spending on the public good becomes lower. The third condition (iii) points out that
even in the case where the State can impose the households allocation of time between
the formal and the informal sector, she allocates positive levels of resources to enforcement
in order to increase the probability of detecting informal rms and, thus, increase revenue
without tax distortions. Moreover, as the probability of detection is increasing and concave
in e, the optimal level of enforcement is increasing in the tax distortion . Obviously, it
also increases with the ne rate, .
Let us now dene the following marginal rate of substitution between enforcement and
public good provision:
MRSe=lf =
@p(e;Ls lf)
@lf
g(Ls   lf ) + @g(Ls lf )@lf p(e; Ls   lf )
@p(e;Ls lf)
@e
g(Ls   lf )
:
This marginal rate of substitution tells us about the trade-o¤ the State faces when choosing
lf and e. For a given level of nes collected, the State can choose to increase the level of
enforcement g(Ls   lf )
 
@p(e; Ls   lf )=@e

or she can increase the level of informality li.
In this case, there are two e¤ects at work. First, for a given level of informal production,
g(Ls   lf ), it marginally increases the probability of detection @p(e; Ls   lf )=@lf . Second,
for a given level of detection of informal rms, it marginally increases the size of the ne
collected @g(Ls   lf )=@lf .
Finally, combining the three rst-order conditions, we obtain:
Remark 2.
@f (lf ; b)
@lf
 
@g(li)
@li
@f (lf ; b)
@b
= (1  )MRSe=lf (e; lf ):
To understand the previous equality, consider the following function:
 (lf ; b) =
@f (lf ; b)
@lf
  @g(li)
@li
:
It is worth to notice that with  equal to 0, we have  (lf ; b
) = 0, which can be considered
as a "pure" e¢ ciency condition. The term "pure" refers to the fact that in such a case, the
time devoted to each sector is chosen to equate their marginal productivities. Technically,
it comes from the fact that e = 0; implying that @p(e = 0; li )=@e ! +1 and therefore
MRSe=lf (e; lf ) = 0. In words, it means that the presence of tax distortions obliges the
State to alter the "pure" e¢ ciency condition. These distortions depend on the marginal
rate of substitution between the size of the informal sector and the level of enforcement
e¤orts. This marginal rate of substitution is informative about how much the State needs
to increase its spending in enforcement to outweigh a reduction of the size of the informal
sector in order to keep the expected ne constant.
To summarise, in presence of tax distortions, the State may optimally tolerate a larger
level of informality in order to reduce the negative impact of distortions on the States
revenues. On the one hand, more informality is associated to less expenditures in the public
good, reducing the e¤ect of tax distortions. On the other hand, because the probability of
detection is increasing in the size of the informal rm, more informality implies more nes
collected by the State and still less tax distortions. These results are summarised in the
following corollary:
Corollary 2. The presence of tax distortions in developing countries may provide a ra-
tionalefor a relatively large informal sector.
This remark is consistent with the estimations provided in Auriol and Walters (2006)
for African developing countries. Indeed, applying the standard Devarajan et als 1-2-
3 model14 to a data base of 38 countries, these authors reveal that there is a strong
positive relationship between the marginal cost of public funds and the informality levels
for the countries in their sample. Our rst-best allocation results allow us to provide an
explanation to this evidence. Despite the fact that we consider that the State can choose
the households allocation of time between the formal and the informal sectors, it may
be optimal for the State to tolerate a larger informal sector in the presence of higher tax
distortions. The shadow cost of public funds may constitute a piece of the puzzle that
explains the so-called broken contractbetween the State and the citizens in developing
countries that are characterised by high levels of informality (see Perry et al., 2007).
14Devarajan et al. (1994).
3.2. Second-best analysis
In the second-best analysis, we consider a decentralised economy in which the State cannot
choose the households allocation of labor between the formal and the informal sectors.
However, we assume that the State is a Stackelberg leader and chooses the optimal allo-
cation of tax revenues between the provision of the public good and enforcement e¤orts,
taking into account the households reaction to these choices.
The second-best analysis is organised in two parts. First, we analyse the reaction
function of the representative household. The second part is devoted to the normative
issue in which the States program consists to choose the allocation of public funds between
enforcement activities and the provision of the public good.
3.2.1. Optimal public policy with tax distortions and non-observable informality
In such a context, the State objective becomes:
max
fb;eg
W SB = f(l^f ; b) + g(Ls   l^f ) + 
1  p(e;
Ls   l^f )g(Ls   l^f )  1
1  (b+ e) (8)
where, l^f (e;  ; b) is implicitly determined by the following households reaction function:
gli(li) (1  p(e; li))  pli(e; li)g(li) = (1  )flf (l^f ; b):
The rst-order conditions are:
@f(:)
@b
  1
1   =  
"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
  @g(:)
@l^f (:)
  
1  
 
@p(:)
@l^f (:)
g(li) +
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
p(e; li)
!#
@l^f (:)
@b
and,
@p(:)
@e
g(li)  1
1   =  
"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
  @g(:)
@l^f (:)
  
1  
 
@p(:)
@l^f (:)
g(li) +
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
p(e; li)
!#
@l^f (:)
@e
:
In order to understand some features of the optimal policy, consider rst that the State
wants to implement the same level of formality (resp. informality) in the rst-best as that
obtained in the second-best (e.g. lf = l

f ). In this case, we have:
Lemma 3. If lf = l

f , then the optimal public policy consists of e
 > e and b > b.
Proof. See the appendix.
Lemma 3 says that, in order to implement the same level of formality as in the rst-best,
the State has to spend more resources in public good provision as well as in enforcement.
It is due to the fact that as pointed out in Remark 3, the levels of formal activities decided
by the household increases in b and e.
Let us consider the case where  = 0.
Remark 3. For  = 0, we have e = 0.
This remark points out that if taxes do not generate distortions, the State still prefers
to spend all its budget in the public good and nothing in enforcement activities. This
result comes from the same mechanism at work that has been revealed in Proposition 1
and Remark 1. It says that spending in the public good is a su¢ cient instrument in the
absence of tax distortions to maximise the representative households welfare. Conversely,
the shadow cost of public funds constitutes the rationale behind the States investment
in enforcement activities. From the States perspective, all other things being equal, it
becomes more protable to spend in enforcement activities when  increases. Indeed, in
the second-best, the rst-order condition in e implies that the term 1   (@p=@e) is
negative, which means that the marginal cost of enforcement activities is lower than its
marginal benet, inducing the State to spend a positive amount of resources on enforcement
activities.
Rearranging the rst-order conditions gives:
@l^f (:)
@b
=

1
1    
@f(:)
@b

"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
+
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
+

1  
@p(:)
@l^f (:)

# ; (9)
@l^f (:)
@e
=

1
1    

1  
@p(:)
@e


"
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
+
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
+

1  
@p(:)
@l^f (:)

# : (10)
Combining the last two conditions leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. In the presence of distorsive taxes and incentives problem, the optimal
public policy follows:
@l^f (:)
@b
@l^f (:)
@e
=
1
1    
@f(:)
@b
1
1    

1  
@p(:)
@e

: (11)
In order to understand Proposition 4, yet let us rst focus on the case when  = 0. The
previous condition becomes:
@f(:)
@b
= 1 MRSe=b:
We can easily recognize the equality obtained in the rs-best case between the marginal
productivity of the public good in the formal sector and its marginal cost. Nevertheless,
this equality is distorted by the marginal rate of substitution between e and b. As long
as the State cannot choose directly the level of informality, she has to set the amounts e
and b taking into account their relative impact on the size of the formal (resp. informal)
sectors.
4. Concluding remarks
This article develops a model where the size of the informal sector is endogenously deter-
mined by the interaction of a representative individual and the government. On the one
hand, the representative individual has to decide the allocation of time between the formal
and the informal sectors. While in the formal sector the individual can make use of a
public good provided by the government but has to pay taxes with probability one, in the
informal sector the individual only pays taxes with an endogenously determined probabil-
ity (which is lower than one) but cannot benet from the use of the government-provided
good in production. The government, on the other hand, has to decide the allocation of
resources (collected through the tax system and nes imposedon those informal rms that
are detected) between enforcement activities to detect and penalize informal activities (the
sticks) and the provision of a public good that can only be used in the formal sector. We
make special emphasis on the role of tax distortions (the shadow cost of public funds) in the
determination of the size of the informal sector, the optimal tax rate and total production,
among other endogenous variables.
Our model could be extended in several ways. First, we consider a representative
household. The introduction of some heterogeneity could be interesting in order to allow
for di¤erent levels of consumption of the public good. In practice, the consumption of
public goods may follow a U-shape that we cannot take into account in our set-up. Second,
in this article we intentionally adopt a "black box approach" regarding the shadow cost
of public funds. This approach contains two advantages: on the one hand, we focus on
the normative feature of the public policy, and moreover we show that such shadow cost
of public funds is one of the rationale of the informal sector and the States enforcement
policy. On the other hand, it is easier to connect with the empirical literature quoted in
this article. However, it would be interesting to shed light on public policies that would
simulateneously reduce the size of the informal sector as well as one of its rationale. It is
in our research agenda.
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5. Appendix
5.1. Proof of Remark 1
Proof. Let us consider the following implicit function:
 (lf ; b; e)  (1  )flf (lf ; b)  gli(Ls   lf )
 
1  p(e; Ls   lf )

+ pli(e;
Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ):
The implicit function theorem yields:
dlf
db
=   @=@b
@=@lf
:
Since @=@lf is negative due to the second-order conditions, we have:
sign

dlf
db

= sign

@
@b

;
with
@
@b
= (1  )@
2f(lf ; b)
@lf@b
> 0:
Similarly, we have
dlf
de
=   @=@e
@=@lf
;
with
@
@e
=

gli(
Lse)  lf )@p(e; li)
@e
+
@2p(e; li)
@lf@e
g(Ls   lf )

 > 0:
Q.E.D.
5.2. Proof of Lemma 3
Consider the following function:
	 (e; b; lf ; ) =
@f(:)
@l^f (:)
  @g(:)
@l^f (:)
  
1  
 
@p(:)
@l^f (:)
g(li) +
@g(:)
@l^f (:)
p(e; li)
!
:
At the rst-best, we have 	
 
e; b; lf ; 

= 0. Moreover, we have:8<:
@f(L lf ;b)
@b
= 1
1  ;
g(L  lf ) = 1  1@p(e;L lf)
@e
:
The second-best is characterized by:8><>:
@f(L l^f ;b)
@b
= 1
1   	

e; b; l^f ; 

@l^f (:)
@b
;
g(L  l^f ) =


1   	

e; b; l^f ; 

@l^f (:)
@e

1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
:
Therefore, we obtain that
g(L  l^f )  g(L  lf ) =
 

1    	

e; b; l^f ; 
 @l^f (:)
@e
!
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
 
0@ 
1  
1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
1A
=

1  
0@ 1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
  1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
1A
 	

e; b; l^f ; 
 @l^f (:)
@e
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
:
We have
g(L  l^f )  g(L  lf )  0
,
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
  1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
 	

e; b; l^f ; 
 @l^f (:)
@e
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
It implies that
1
@p(e;L l^f)
@e
 1
@p(e;L lf)
@e
:
According to that @2p=@e@li > 0, we have e  e.
The same reasoning applies for the public spending. Q.E.D.
5.3. Robustness check
In this appendix, we explore the possibility to introduce a distorsion f at the ne level.
The States objective is the maximisation of the households utility, that is:
max
flf ;b;eg
W FB = (1  )f(lf ; b) + g(Ls   lf )
 
1  p(e; Ls   lf )

; (12)
subject to the following budget constraint:
(1  )f(lf ; b) + p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ) (1  f )  b+ e; (13)
that can be rewritten:
 =
b+ e  p(e; Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ) (1  f )
(1  ) f(lf ; b) : (14)
Replacing the previous expressin in the States objective function, one obtains:
max
flf ;b;eg
W FB = f(lf ; b) + g(Ls   lf )  b+ e
1   +
  f
1   p(e;
Ls   lf )g(Ls   lf ): (15)
The rst-order conditions yield:
@f(lf ; b)
@lf
  @g(li)
@lf
=
(  f )
1  
@p(e; L  lf )
@lf
g(li) +
@g(li)
@lf
p(e; L  lf );
@f(b)
@b
=
1
1  ;
@p(e; L  lf )
@e
g(li) =
1
(  f ):
One may observe that the amount of public good supplied remains unchanged. More-
over, our results remain qualitatively unchanged as long as  > f . Otherwise, we would
obtain that the opimal policy involves zero enforcement e¤ort, and consequently the amount
of optimal informal labor supply would be higher.
